ISIDRO ABLAZA
vs
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in RTC Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.
The RTC dismissed the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage.
The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus:
While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. xxxx
Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party to said case.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is a real party-in-interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code
HELD: YES
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. Thus, a Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Section 2 (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1) Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2) Those filed in relation to marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under AM 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog, the children were allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. “Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage.......is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral.” xxx
It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes......the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
However, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a “proper interest” can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano’s surviving wife, stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein. We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza, and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of the property involved therein. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.
WHEREFORE, the case is reinstated, and its records are returned to RTC Masbate, for further proceedings, with instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants.
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