On the people's right to initiative (Political Law)

Legislative power is lodged in the Legislative Department. Local government units may exercise such power only thru a delegation from the Congress. However, the exception to this is the expressed reservation in favor of the people, found in Art. VI, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution. This refers to the people's right to initiative.

Art. VI, Sec. 32 - Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least 10 per centum of the total number of registered voters , of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3 per centum of the registered voters thereof.

Considering that the above-cited provision directs the Congress to enact a law for the creation of a system of initiative and referendum, such provision is not self-executing. Consequently, Congress indeed enacted a law - Republic Act No. 6735 or the People's Initiative and Referendum Act.

In Santiago vs COMELEC, RA 6735 was declared to have failed to provide a procedure to enable the non self-executing provision of Art. XVII, Sec.2 of the Constitution. The said statute only refers to amendments of national and local legislations. Hence, the right of the people to propose amendments of the Constitution still remains non self-executing.


The Lambino Case's main thrust is the difference between a revision and an amendment of the Constitution. There is no need to revisit the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC.

Magallona vs. Hon. Ermita, et al. (Political Law)

Magallona vs. Hon. Ermita, et al.

 G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

• Baseline laws, such as R.A. 9522, are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III-States-parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. It gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States-parties exercise treaty bases rights (right of sovereignty; right to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitation laws; right to exploit resources).

• UNCLOS III and its ancillary baseline laws play no role in the acquisition or diminution of territory, because under traditional international law typology, states acquire or lose territory through occupation, accretion, cession, and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the standard of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with treaty terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.'

• Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. However, the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over such islands was committed to text through RA 9522’s use of the framework of Regime of Islands, under which islands located at an ‘appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago’ generate their own applicable maritime zones. Such classification of the KIG and Scarborough Shoal made by the Congress manifests the Philippines’ compliance with its pacta sunt servanda obligation under the UNCLOS III.

• The fact of sovereignty does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty.

•  UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space – the exclusive economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas.

Province of North Cotabato vs. Gov’t of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel (Political Law)

Province of North Cotabato vs. Gov’t of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel

G.R. No. 183591; October 2008

• An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state (the associate) delegates certain responsibilities to the other (the principal), while maintaining its international status as a state.

• The concept of ‘association’ is not recognized under the 1987 Constitution. The Constitution does not contemplate any state in its jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS (Political Law)

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS

G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997

• If a law or contract violates any norm of the Constitution, that law or contract is null and void, and without any force and effect.

• Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

• Provisions of the Constitution are presumed to be self-executing unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate.

• A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the Constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

CIty of Manila vs Judge Colet (Taxation Law)

City of Manila, et al vs. Judge Colet, and Malaysian Airline System 

G.R. No. 120051, December 10, 2014

FACTS:

The case involves 10 consolidated petitions involving several corporations operating as “transportation contractors, persons who transport passenger or freight for hire, and common carriers by land, air or water” with principal offices in Metro Manila, and City of Manila’s Ordinance No. 7807 which amended Sec. 21 (B) of the Manila Revenue Code. Sec.21 (B) imposed business tax on “transportation contractors, persons who transport passenger or freight for hire, and common carriers by land, air or water”; while the subject ordinance amended such by lowering the tax rate from 3% per annum to .5% per annum. The City of Manila, through its City Treasurer, began imposing and collecting the business tax under Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, beginning January 1994.

Because they were assessed and/or compelled to pay business taxes pursuant to Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code before they were issued their business permits for 1994, several corporations questioned the constitutionality of Sec. 21 (B) for being contrary to the Constitution and the Local Government Code, and asked for the refund of what they had paid as business tax.

The City of Manila, argued that it was constitutional and valid; and such position was adopted by the RTC and the CA when the case reached the respective fora. The City argued that the enactment of Sec. 21 (B) is based on the exempting clause found at the beginning of Sec. 133, in conjunction with Section 143(h), of the LGC. 

SEC. 133.  Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. –

Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:

x x x x

(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Code;

SEC. 143. Tax on Business. – The municipality may impose taxes on the following businesses:

x x x x

(h) On any business, not otherwise specified in the preceding paragraphs, which the sanggunian concerned may deem proper to tax: Provided, That on any business subject to the excise, value-added or percentage tax under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, the rate of tax shall not exceed two percent (2%) of gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year.

The sanggunian concerned may prescribe a schedule of graduated tax rates but in no case to exceed the rates prescribed herein. (Emphases supplied by the Supreme Court)

ISSUE:

Is Sec. 21 (B) of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, unconstitutional?

HELD:

Yes. The power to tax is not inherent in LGUs to whom the power must be delegated by Congress and must be exercised within the guidelines and limitations that Congress may provide. 

Sec. 5 of Article X of the Constitution granted LGUs the “power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide...” In conformity with said constitutional provision, the Local Gov’t Code was enacted by Congress.

Sec. 130 of the LGC provides for the fundamental principles governing the taxing powers of LGUs. Sec. 133 provides for the common limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs. Among the common limitations on the taxing power of LGUs is Section 133(j) of the LGC, which states that “unless otherwise provided herein,” the taxing power of LGUs shall not extend to “taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Code.”

Section 133(j) of the LGC clearly and unambiguously proscribes LGUs from imposing any tax on the gross receipts of transportation contractors, persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water.  Yet, confusion arose from the phrase “unless otherwise provided herein,” found at the beginning of the said provision, and the City of Manila anchors the validity of Sec. 21 (B) on said phrase.

However, the Court is not convinced with the City’s contention.  Sec. 133(j) of the LGC prevails over Sec. 143(h) of the same Code, and Sec. 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, was manifestly in contravention of the former.

Sec. 133(j) of the LGC is a specific provision that explicitly withholds from any LGU the power to tax the gross receipts of transportation contractors, common carriers, persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water.   In contrast, Sec. 143 of the LGC defines the general power of the municipality (as well as the city, if read in relation to Section 151 of the same Code) to tax businesses within its jurisdiction. 

The succeeding proviso of Section 143(h) of the LGC, viz., “Provided, That on any business subject to the excise, value-added or percentage tax under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, the rate of tax shall not exceed two percent (2%) of gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year,” is not a specific grant of power to the municipality or city to impose business tax on the gross sales or receipts of such a business.  Rather, the proviso only fixes a maximum rate of imposable business tax in case the business taxed under Section 143(h) of the LGC happens to be subject to excise, value added, or percentage tax under the NIRC.

The omnibus grant of power to municipalities and cities under Section 143(h) of the LGC cannot overcome the specific exception/exemption in Section 133(j) of the same Code. 

In the case at bar, the sanggunian of the municipality or city cannot enact an ordinance imposing business tax on the gross receipts of transportation contractors, persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water, when said sanggunian was already specifically prohibited from doing so. 

Such construction gives effect to both Sections 133(j) and 143(h) of the LGC.  Also, Sec. 5(b) of the LGC itself, on Rules of Interpretation, provides that in case of doubt, any tax ordinance shall be construed strictly against the LGU enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Furthermore, such a construction is pursuant to the legislative intent to exclude from the taxing power of the LGU the imposition of business tax against common carriers to prevent a duplication of the so-called “common carrier’s tax.”