Bayot vs CA (Civil Law)

G.R. No. 155635             November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, 

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.

x----------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 163979             November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, 

vs.

VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca to be an American citizen born in Agaña, Guam, USA. They had a daughter named Alix, who was born in California. In 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued a divorce decree and later on approved the Agreement executed by the parties with regard to the settlement of their property relations under which it was stated that their only property was that in Acacia Drive, Muntinlupa City.

Meanwhile, less than a month from the issuance of the divorce decree, Rebecca filed with the RTC Makati a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Rebecca, however, later on withdrawn. In March 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the RTC Muntinlupa, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix.

Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of. Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca who on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss and granted Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, ruling that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. Vicente thus filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which court effectively dismissed Rebecca’s case for failure to state a cause of action, and reversed the orders the RTC. The CA held that because of the divorce decree, Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

ISSUES:

1) Whether petitioner was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996

2) Whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

HELD:

1) There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.

Furthermore, under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required. Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides that No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.

Thus, this clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen.

2) The divorce decree and the decree approving the Agreement on the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca are both valid. First, at the time of the divorce, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the divorce decrees. Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement executed after the divorce decree was rendered Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

Garcia v. Recio: a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

...........

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce Decree: Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed.

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca. The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, which provides that if the divorce capacitates the alien spouse to marry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Both elements obtain in the instant case. As to the property settlement embodied in the parties’ Agreement which was affirmed by the divorce court, since Rebecca has not repudiated the same, she is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear that Rebecca lacks cause of action to file the petition for declaration of absolute nullity because there is no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

However, the Court does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED on the ground of mootness. RTC Decision and CA Resolution are AFFIRMED.

Ablaza vs Republic (Civil Law)

ISIDRO ABLAZA

vs

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 158298  August 11, 2010  

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in RTC Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. 

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

The RTC dismissed the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage.

        

The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus:

       While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. xxxx

         Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party to said case. 

ISSUE:         

Whether the petitioner is a real party-in-interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code

HELD: YES

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. Thus, a Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.

Section 2 (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:

1) Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and

2) Those filed in relation to marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage.  Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under AM 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog, the children were allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise:

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. “Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage.......is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral.” xxx

It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. 

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes......the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.

However, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a “proper interest” can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest.

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.

  

Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano’s surviving wife, stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein. We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza, and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of the property involved therein. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.

WHEREFORE, the case is reinstated, and its records are returned to RTC Masbate, for further proceedings, with instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants.

Ty vs CA (Civil Law)

OFELIA P. TY

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES

G.R. No. 127406.  November 27, 2000

QUISUMBING, J.:

Respondent Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 1977, in Manila.  Then they had a church wedding on August 1977.  However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding was also declared void for lack of consent of the parties. Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Villanueva, Reyes wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, thru civil rites on April 4, 1979 in Pasay. Three years after, on April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati.

On January 1991, Edgardo filed a case with the RTC of Pasig, praying that his marriage to Ofelia Ty be declared null and void because they allegedly had no marriage license when they got married.  He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria.   The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979. 

Ofelia, in defending her marriage to private respondent, submitted their Marriage License which was issued in Cavite on April 3, 1979. He did not question this document when it was submitted in evidence. However, the fact that the civil marriage of Edgardo and Ofelia took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed.  It also appears indisputable that petitioner and respondent had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.

The Pasig RTC ruled in favor of Edgardo Reyes and declared his marriage to Ofelia Ty null and void ab initio. Both parties appealed to the CA, which subsequently affirmed the trial court’s decision.  It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted.  

ISSUE:

1) Is a decree of nullity of the first marriage required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly?

2) May the Family Code be given retroactive effect to the instant case?

3) What is the effect of re-using for a church wedding the marriage license that was 1^st used in a civil wedding 3 years ago?

4) Is petitioner entitled to moral damages as indemnity for her husband’s filing of a baseless complaint?

HELD:

1) and 2) NO.

The SC held different rulings regarding the matter however, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. The rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage –

Art. 40.  The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases.  In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993), the Court held:

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.  A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.  (Art. 39 of the Family Code).  Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.  (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).

However, Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case.  The first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage.  The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant.  On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon.  We held that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel.  At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendozaand Aragon.  The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage.  In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.  As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights.  In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent.  

3) Coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage.  As petitioner contends, the CA erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial.  She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and weight.  She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality.  

In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first.

4) No damages should be awarded in the present case. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting.  She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents.   Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds.  To do so, would make the application of the law absurd.  Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity.  Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation. There are other remedies (legal separation, or prosecution for adultery or concubinage).

Atienza vs Brillantes (Civil Law)

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA

vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

QUIASON, J.:

Atienza filed a case for Gross Immorality against Judge Brillantes. He alleges that he lives with Yolanda De Castro and their two children at Makati whenever he is in Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children. Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for him.

Atienza claims that Brillantes is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children; that respondent caused his arrest on January 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.

For his part, Judge Brillantes alleges that Atienza was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro. He also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having 5 children with her. He alleges that the two marriages between him ang Ongkiko were not valid because they had no marriage license then. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent. Thus, he claims that when he married De Castro in, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. He argues that the requirement of a judicial declaration of nullity under Ar. 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him because his 1^st marriage with Ongkiko took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code, and his 2nd marriage took place in 1991, governed by the Family Code.

ISSUE:

WON a judicial declaration of nullity of Brillantes’ marriage to Ongkiko was necessary before he could validly marry De Castro

May the provisions of the Family Code be given retroactive effect for this case?

Is Judge Brillantes guilty of gross immorality?

HELD:

YES to all.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).

Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.

Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.

It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.