BRIGIDO B. QUIAO
vs.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS
C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by their mother RITA QUIAO,
-------- A vested right is one whose
existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will
of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency.
To be vested, a right must
have become a title—legal or equitable—to the present or future enjoyment of
property.
While one may not be
deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process
and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
----------
Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, The interest of each
spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes
neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it
appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation
and settlement.
---------- The definition of “net profits”
under Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community
regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.
----------
difference between ACP and CPG regime
G.R. No 176556 /
July 4, 2012
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
On Oct. 26, 2000, Rita C.
Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against Brigido B. Quiao.
The RTC ruled in favor of Rita; all of their children, except Letecia who is of
legal age, was ordered to remain under the custody of Rita who was adjudged as
the innocent spouse. As to the proporties, the ff. is the dispositive portion
of the judgment:
Except for the personal and
real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining properties,
namely:
1)coffee
mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2)coffee
mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3)corn
mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4)coffee
mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5)parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6)parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de
Bugabos, Butuan City;
7)parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8)Bashier
Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally
between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the respective
legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of
[P]45,740.00.
[Petitioner’s]
share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is
forfeited in
favor of the common children.
Neither party filed an MR nor
an appeal. On Dec.12, 2005, the
respondents filed a motion for execution which the trial court granted, and a
writ was issued. On July 6, 2006, the writ
was partially executed with the petitioner paying the respondents the following:
(a) P22,870.00 – as petitioner's
share of the payment of the conjugal share;
(b) P19,000.00 – as attorney's
fees; and
(c) P5,000.00 – as litigation
expenses.
On July 7, 2006, or after
more than nine months from the promulgation of
the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking
the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
Thus, the RTC explained that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED”
denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the
separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” The Order further
held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not
have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63,
No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. Thus, the RTC said that there was no blatant disparity
when the sheriff intended to forfeit all the remaining properties after
deducting the payments of the debts, because only separate properties of the Brigido
shall be delivered to him which he has none.
Not
satisfied with the Order, the Brigido filed an MR. Consequently, the RTC
issued another Order dated November 8, 2006, holding that although
the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may
still consider the Motion for Clarification because Brigido simply wanted to
clarify the meaning of “net profit earned.” Furthermore, the same Order held:
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated
August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED, which is
subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered
to be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.
Thereafter,
Rita filed an MR praying for the correction and reversal of the Order dated
November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, the trial court had
changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' MR whereby the Order
dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31,
2006.
Not
satisfied with the trial court's Order, Brigido filed on February 27, 2007 this
instant Petition for Review under Rule 45.
ISSUES:
What law governs the
dissolution and liquidation of the common properties of a couple who got
married in 1977 (before the Family Code was enacted) and obtained a decree of
legal separation when the Family Code is already in effect?
Can the Family Code be
given retroactive effect for purposes of determining the net profits to be
forfeited as a result of the decree of legal separation without impairing
vested rights acquired under the Old Civil Code?
WON Brigido acquired vested
rights over half of the properties of the CPG pursuant to Art. 143 of the Old
Civil Code which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains
is owned in common by the husband and wife.”
HELD:
1) Article 129 of the
Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code
2) No, it cannot be given
retroactive effect if it will impair vested rights. However, the Family Code
applies in the instant case because there is no vested right that will be
impaired. (based on Art. 256 of the Family Code which provides for
retroactivity except when vested rights will be impaired)
3) No, he did not.
The
Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory at the time the
Motion for Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006.
From
the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question the
RTC’s Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270
days, the petitioner never raised a single issue until the decision had already
been partially executed. Thus at the time the
petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial court’s decision has
become final and executory. A
judgment becomes final and executory when the reglementary period to appeal
lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. Consequently, no court, not
even this Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a
case or modify a judgment that became final.
Brigido
argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment, which “never
attains finality and cannot be a source of any right nor any obligation.” But
what precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a judgment
becomes void?
“A judgment is null and
void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant the relief or no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both.” In other
words, a court, which does not have the power to decide a case or that has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, will issue a void judgment
or a coram
non judice.
The
questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For sure, the trial court
has jurisdiction over a case involving legal separation. The RTC also acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of both parties, considering that summons and a
copy of the complaint with its annexes were served upon the herein petitioner. Thus,
without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the questioned judgment, has
jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties.
Thus,
the judgment, being final and and not void, cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification
is meant to correct what may be considered an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law. In fact, we have ruled that for “[as] long as the public respondent acted
with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof
will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or
corrected only by appeal.” Granting without admitting that the RTC's judgment
dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the petitioner's remedy should be an
appeal filed within the reglementary period. Unfortunately, the
petitioner failed to do this. He has
already lost the chance to question the trial court's decision, which has
become immutable and unalterable.
Article
129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties' property
relation is governed by the system
of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.
Petitioner
and respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the
exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since
they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains. Under this property relation, “the husband and the wife
place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income
from their work or industry.” The husband and wife also own in common all the
property of the conjugal partnership of gains.
At the
time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the
operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case,
and the applicable law, in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership assets and liabilities is concerned, is Article 129 of the Family
Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is
applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code “this Code
shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law.”
Now,
the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half
of the common properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the trial
court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and
129 of the Family Code?
No.
In Go,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, we define and explained “vested
right” in the following manner:
A vested right is one whose
existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will
of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term “vested right”
expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and
natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an
innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to
inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must
have become a title—legal or equitable—to the present or future enjoyment of
property.
October
18, 2005 ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer
Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita:
The concept of “vested right”
is a consequence of the constitutional
guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest
which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state
action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a
demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed
and irrefutable.
From
the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his “vested
right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is
founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the
present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the
respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be
awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial
court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as
circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all
the community properties of the parties. Second, when the Decision dated
October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial
court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,”
pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot
claim being deprived of his right to due process.
Furthermore,
we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's “vested right” is
one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176
of the old Civil Code. This provision is like
Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's
share in the conjugal partnership profits. The
said provision says:
Art.
176. In case of legal
separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the conjugal
partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the
children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal
partnership property came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from
the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate property of the
guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
In case
there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net
profits.
From
the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis
considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the
conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a
legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after
the petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's
vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the
trial court found him the guilty party.
Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay,
Jr.:
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the
interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy,
which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen
into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result
of the liquidation and settlement. The
interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or “remanente liquido” (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of
the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the
right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest
until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of
the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of
conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided
between the spouses or their respective heirs.
The
net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the
separate properties of the spouses and the products of their labor and
industry.
The
petitioner inquires from us the meaning of “net profits” earned by the conjugal
partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article
63 of the Family Code. He insists that since there
is no other provision under the Family Code, which defines “net profits” earned
subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of the
Family Code applies.
What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of “net
profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the
computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute community?
First
and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the property
relations between the parties and the applicable law as to the definition of “net
profits.” As earlier discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to
the property relations of the parties. In other words, the computation and the
succession of events will follow the provisions under Article 129 of the said
Code.
As to
the definition of “net profits,” we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of
the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing
the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63,
No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits “shall be
the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.”
Thus,
without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of
the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family
Code. Where
lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the processes
used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102
of the Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.
Let us
now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute community
regime and the conjugal partnership regime.
On
Absolute Community Regime:
When a
couple enters into a regime
of absolute community,
the husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all
the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and
those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of
the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when
the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is
divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or
in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value
each one may have originally owned.
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of
marriage,
1) An
inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each;
2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid
out of the absolute community's assets;
----if the community's
properties are insufficient, the separate properties of each of the couple will
be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate
properties will be delivered to each of them;
3) The
net remainder of the absolute community is its net assets, which shall be
divided between the husband and the wife;
----for purposes of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.
On
Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Before
we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it
clear that Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case for
purposes only of defining “net profit.” As earlier explained, the
definition of “net profits” in Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies to
both the absolute community regime and conjugal partnership regime as provided
for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on
Legal Separation.
Now,
when a couple enters into a regime
of conjugal partnership of gains under
Article 142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund
the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry,
and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own
property and debts. The law does not intend to
effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a
complete separation of capitals.
Considering
that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code, Article
129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's properties in
the event that the conjugal partnership of
gains is dissolved. (See Art. 129)
In the
normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of
the properties of the spouses:
(a) An
inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the
couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties. In the instant
case, the trial court found that the
couple has no separate properties when they married. Rather, the trial
court identified the conjugal properties as stated above (coffee mills, corn
mills, etc.)
(b)
Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership
during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal
partnership; and if the community is enriched at the expense of the separate
properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties to
their respective owners shall be made.
(c) Conjugal
partnership shall pay the debts of the conjugal partnership; while the debts
and obligation of each of the spouses shall be paid from their respective
separate properties. But if the conjugal
partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses
with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable.
(d)
Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of
the wife shall be returned to each of them. In the instant case, since
it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties, there
is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above
are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus,
ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided
equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the
trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net
profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused,
like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty
party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property
which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.
The RTC
Decision dated October 10, 2005 is AFFIRMED.
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