Bayot vs CA (Civil Law)

G.R. No. 155635             November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, 

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.

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G.R. No. 163979             November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, 

vs.

VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca to be an American citizen born in Agaña, Guam, USA. They had a daughter named Alix, who was born in California. In 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued a divorce decree and later on approved the Agreement executed by the parties with regard to the settlement of their property relations under which it was stated that their only property was that in Acacia Drive, Muntinlupa City.

Meanwhile, less than a month from the issuance of the divorce decree, Rebecca filed with the RTC Makati a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Rebecca, however, later on withdrawn. In March 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the RTC Muntinlupa, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix.

Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of. Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca who on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss and granted Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, ruling that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. Vicente thus filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which court effectively dismissed Rebecca’s case for failure to state a cause of action, and reversed the orders the RTC. The CA held that because of the divorce decree, Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

ISSUES:

1) Whether petitioner was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996

2) Whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

HELD:

1) There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.

Furthermore, under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required. Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides that No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.

Thus, this clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen.

2) The divorce decree and the decree approving the Agreement on the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca are both valid. First, at the time of the divorce, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the divorce decrees. Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement executed after the divorce decree was rendered Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

Garcia v. Recio: a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

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It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce Decree: Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed.

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca. The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, which provides that if the divorce capacitates the alien spouse to marry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Both elements obtain in the instant case. As to the property settlement embodied in the parties’ Agreement which was affirmed by the divorce court, since Rebecca has not repudiated the same, she is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear that Rebecca lacks cause of action to file the petition for declaration of absolute nullity because there is no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

However, the Court does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED on the ground of mootness. RTC Decision and CA Resolution are AFFIRMED.