Republic vs Remman Enterprises (Civil Law)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO

G.R. No. 199310; February 19, 2014; REYES, J.

FACTS:

On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises filed an application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated in Taguig, Metro Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.

The RTC found the application for registration sufficient in form and substance and set it for initial hearing on May 30, 2002. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette and was likewise posted in a conspicuous places.

On the day of the hearing, only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the respondent’s application for registration. Sometime after, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) likewise filed its Opposition, alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

During the trial, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador and Bella Mijares, respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime, who cultivated and planted different kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989. The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the respondent; (2) survey plans of the subject properties; (3) technical descriptions of the subject properties; (4) Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate; (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; and (6) certifications dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno, Senior Forest Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain 

For its part, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application for registration should be denied since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic map of Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the then Department of National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.

On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual topographic survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. The RTC pointed out that LLDA’s claim that the elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay since the same was merely based on the topographic map that was prepared using an aerial survey on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was indeed conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the preparation of the topographic map. 

Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always remain the same; that the elevations of the subject properties may have already changed since 1966 when the supposed aerial survey, from which the topographic map used by LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the method used by Engr. Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the subject properties.

Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that the same could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas that can be covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not those that are already far from it, which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed out that the subject properties are more than a kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE:

Is respondent entitled to the registration of title to the subject properties?

HELD: NO

That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact by the lower courts, which this Court, generally may not disregard. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so. That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily mean that they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

While deference is due to the lower courts’ finding that the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake, the Court nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to the subject properties.

"Under the Regalian Doctrine, xxxx all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable."

The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Under said Section, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: 
1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; 
2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two certifications issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain "under Project No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968."

However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Court clarified that, in addition to the 1) certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must 2) prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They must 3) present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and 4) certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the records.

In Republic v. Roche, the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties. Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical description of the land which bears no information regarding the land’s classification. She did not bother to establish the status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.

The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its application for registration are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the respondent to present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the application for registration in spite of the failure of the respondent to prove by well-nigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are alienable and disposable.

Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court form part of the law of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent points out that its application for registration of title was filed and was granted by the RTC prior to the Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties. 

The Court does not agree.

Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration was filed and granted by RTC prior to the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the present case; it is not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary that the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect. "Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one."

Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject properties since 1943, the respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena which are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession and occupation of the subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to present any other evidence to prove the character of the possession and occupation by it and its predecessors-in-interest of the subject properties.

For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.

Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have indeed planted crops on the subject properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject properties have been possessed and occupied by them in the manner contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation, which is not the possession and occupation required by law.

"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years."

Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership." That the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or possession of the subject properties starting that year. 

WHEREFORE, respondent's application for registration is denied.

Snippets and Doctrines of Cases on Legal Separation

Aida Bañez vs Gabriel Bañez – (2002)

- Multiple appeals may not be taken in an action for legal separation. To hold otherwise would constitute splitting a cause of action because a legal separation case involves only one cause of action. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties.  The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation. They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. 

Enrico Pacete, and Clarita De La Concepcion [2^nd wife] vs Hon. Carriaga Jr, and Concepcion Pacete [1^st wife] - (1994)

- Private respondent filed for an action for the declaration of absolute nullity of the marriage between petitioners, and for legal separation against Enrico. Petitioners were declared in default and a judgment by default was rendered in favor of private respondent.

- Marriage is a special contract and an inviolable institution to which the state is vitally interested Thus, the Rules of Court expressly proscribes the court from issuing default orders in cases of Legal Separation, Petition for Nullity of Marriage and Annulment of Marriage. Art. 101 (now Art. 60, FC) of the NCC expressly provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. Further, Art. 103 (Now Art. 58, FC) of the NCC requires that an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition” (six-months cooling – off period rule).

William Ong vs Lucita Ong – (2006)

- The SC is not a trier of facts. Both the CA and the court a quo concluded that based on the testimonies of a number of witnesses, including a doctor and Lucita’s sister, that indeed petitioner beat her and was grossly abusive to her and her children. Further, petitioner admitted that there was no day that he and Lucita did not fight and blamed the latter for her shortcomings as a wife.

Brigido Quiao vs Rita Quiao – (2012)

- Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code governs the dissolution and liquidation of the common properties of a couple who got married in 1977 (before the Family Code was enacted) and obtained a decree of legal separation when the Family Code is already in effect.

Snippets and Doctrines of Cases on Presumptive Death for Purposes of Remarriage Art. 41 Family Code

Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death for Purposes of Remarriage

Antonia Armas [sister of 2^nd husband] vs. Marietta Calisterio – (2000)

- Respondent contracted 2^nd marriage with Teodoro Calisterio, without securing a court declaration that her 1^st husband, who had been absent and whose whereabouts had been unknown for 11 years, was presumptively dead. When Teodoro died, his sister Antonia claimed that she was the sole heir, considering that the marriage between Teodoro and respondent is void for being bigamous.

- As to the validity of a subsequent marriage solemnized under the Civil Code (based on Art. 83, CC)

1) VOID unless 1^st marriage was annulled or dissolved;

2) VALID if 1^st spouse was absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive; if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than 7 years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage; if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. (“deemed valid until declared null and void by a competent court”)

- For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong — it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. The Court does not find these circumstances to be here extant.

- A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence (7 years) is met. Respondent’s 2^nd marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the 1^st husband (James Bounds).

Republic vs Gregorio Nolasco [the seaman with British wife] – (1993)

- The requirement in Art. 41 of the FC, that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is dead, was not satisfied. Nolasco’s efforts (searching for her whenever his ship docked in England; sending her letters which were all returned to him; and inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless) to locate his wife was insufficient and too sketchy to form a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. They only proved that his wife chose not to communicate with their common acquaintances.

Angelita Valdez vs Republic – (2009)

- The requirement of “well-founded belief of absent spouse’s death” provided in Art. 41 of the FC does not apply to marriages solemnized under the Civil Code. Neither is a judicial declaration of presumptive death necessary before the present spouse can contract a subsequent marriage; because the FC cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as it will impair vested rights. In the present case, if the FC will be applied, it will ultimately result to the invalidation of petitioner’s subsequent marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. What is only required under the CC is that (1) the former spouse had been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, (2) that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, (3) that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

- A judicial presumption of death, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. In the present case, death of the former husband was presumed to have taken place on the 7^th year of absence.

Republic vs Ferventino Tango – (2009)

- Appeal filed by the Republic is improper because under Art. 253 and 247 of the FC, actions filed under Art. 41 (for the declaration presumptive death) is a summary proceeding and the judgment therein shall be immediately final and executory. Thus, no appeal can be had. The remedy is a petition for certiorari.

- Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the SC's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

Republic vs Gloria Bermudez-Lorino – (2005)

- An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is immediately final and executory.  The right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege.  Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law (which includes the present action for declaration for presumptive death) are “immediately final and executory”, the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein.

- Difference between having the supposed appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the RTC decision sought to be appealed is immediately final and executory, and the denial of the appeal for lack of merit:  In the former, the supposed appellee can immediately ask for the issuance of an Entry of Judgment in the RTC, whereas, in the latter, the appellant can still raise the matter to the SC on petition for review and the RTC judgment cannot be executed until the SC makes the final pronouncement.

Republic vs Yolanda Granada – (2012)

- A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding as expressly provided by Art. 253 of the FC. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the FC provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory. It is unappeallable and thus, the remedy is a petition for certiorari.

- Art. 41 of the Family Code imposes more stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil Code. The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news that the absentee is still alive; or that the absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code provision prescribes a “well-founded belief” that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

- The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. Nevertheless, the belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.

Republic vs Maria Fe Cantor – (2013)

- Certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death under the FC.

- Declaration of presumptive death under Art. 41 of the FC imposes a stricter standard than that of Art. 83 of the Civil Code. Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief"

- The Strict Standard Approach is consistent with the State’s policy to protect and strengthen marriage. It is also for the benefit of the present spouse, to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy. Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the present spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively established. The decision of the competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively negated.

Snippets and Doctrines of Cases on Bigamous Marriages

Lucio Morigo vs People – (2004)

- When the marriage is void because a formal requirement is missing [in this case, marriage ceremony] there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Morigo is acquitted of bigamy because his first marriage was void ab initio.

Victoria Jarillo vs People – (2009)

- A marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.  In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. The action for and the judicial declaration of nullity [based on psychological incapacity] came after the charge of bigamy.

Veronico Tenebro vs CA – (2004)

- The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

- A marriage contract, by itself, is sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage. It should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage. Thus, it is also sufficient to establish the 1^st and 2^nd elements of bigamy [offender is legally married; marriage has not been legally dissolved].

Myrna Antone vs Leo Beronilla [accused] – (2010)

- Citing Tenebro vs CA: Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.

- Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it quashed the Information for Bigamy. The issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense.

Cenon Teves vs PP, and Danilo Bongalan [complainant, uncle of Cenon’s first wife] – (2011)

- Complaint for bigamy was filed with the Office of the Public Prosecutor. Action for declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage was then filed by petitioner, and judgment was rendered therein declaring the marriage void. It was then the Information for Bigamy was formally filed in court. Following petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court

- A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. In this case, finality of the decision declaring the first marriage void was only reached 5 years after the celebration of the 2^nd marriage. Thus, respondent is guilty of bigamy.

Atilano Nollora, Jr. [Muslim convert] vs People – (2011)

- Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "in case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Family Code in lieu of the Civil Code shall apply.” That both marriages of Nollora were not solemnized according to Muslim law, and hence the Family Code applies; that he asserted in his marriage certificate to the 2^nd marriage that he was ‘single’; that both of his marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim are indicative of his criminal intent and liability for the crime of bigamy.

- The Code of Muslim Personal laws also substantially provides that any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify the Shari’a Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them object; an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said council fails to secure the wife’s consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27 [Muslim Code], decide whether or not to sustain her objection.

Miguel Villatuya vs Atty. Bede Tabalingcos – (2012)

- This is a disbarment case against Tabalingcos; one of the grounds for which is gross immorality for marrying two other women while his first marriage was still subsisting. Villatuya presented as evidence a certification from the NSO that Tabalingcos contracted marriage thrice and the dates of the celebrations, and names of the women were also indicated. He also submitted copies of the 3 Marriage Certificates. Tabalingcos did not present any evidence to rebut abovementioned documents. He contends that after his discovery of the 2^nd and 3^rd marriages, he filed civil actions for their annul the Marriage Contracts, treating the latter as ordinary agreements rather than as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on marriage, considering that he did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code.

- The documents, certified by the NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a person, is accorded much evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.

- Respondent’s regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.

Merlinda Cipriano Montañes [daughter from 1^st marriage of 2nd husband of Lourdes] vs Lourdes Cipriano [accused] – (2012)

- 1^st marriage was held in 1976, while the 2^nd was in 1983. Decision declaring the 1^st marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity became final and executory on October 2003. Montañes filed bigamy case against Cipriano on 2004; Respondent contends that since her 1st marriage was celebrated in 1976, Art. 40 of the FC should not be given retroactive effect in her case because it will impair her right to remarry without need of a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage.

- What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Atienza vs Brillantes: Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights."

- Citing Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out that the danger of not enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code is that it would render nugatory the provision on bigamy.

Sun Insurance vs Asuncion (Remedial Law)

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION (Judge, RTC Quezon City) and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG

G.R. Nos. 79937-38; February 13, 1989; GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS:  On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance filed a complaint with the RTC Makati for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period.

On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the RTC QC for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, initially against petitioner Sun Insurance, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint docketed as Civil Case Q-41177 sought, among others, the payment of damages. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about P50 Million.

Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together with 22 other cases assigned to different branches of the RTC QC which were under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to the SC. The SC ordered that the cases be re-raffled, the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.

Thus, Judge Solano, to whose sala Civil Case Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, instructed the Clerk of Court to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate. On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On August 30,1984, an amended complaint was filed by private respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated.

Respondent Judge Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution of the SC since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered. Private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than P10 Million as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70.

On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance with the SC Resolution and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent's claim of "not less than P10 M as actual and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion.

On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20 M as damages so the total claim amounts to about P65 Million. Seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00.

On August 13, 1987, the CA denied the petition insofar as it seeks annulment of the order, and petitioner’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Hence, the instant petition.

During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988.

ISSUE:

Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 even if there was nonpayment of the correct and proper docket fee?

Petitioners’ contention: Considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. As basis, petitioners cite Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA:

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.

Respondent’s contention: Manchester cannot apply retroactively for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no such ruling as yet. Magaspi v. Ramolete applies wherein it was held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.

HELD: YES, the court acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Nevertheless, the contention that Manchester cannot retroactively apply is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, this Court held that the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. Plaintiff-appellant deposited the deficiency in the docket fee outside the 15-day reglementary period for appeal. Thus, the CFI (as appellate court) did not acquire jurisdiction as the appeal was not perfected.

In Lee vs. Republic, the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in 1956. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the filing of petitioner's declaration of intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.

In Malimit vs. Degamo, the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an original petition for quo warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the CFI, within the one-week period after the proclamation as provided therefor by law. However, the required docket fees were paid only after the expiration of said period. Consequently, this Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date when it was mailed.

Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must be paid before a court will act on a petition or complaint. However, we also held that said rule is not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same decedent as he is not required to file a separate action for each will but instead he may have other wills probated in the same special proceeding then pending before the same court.

Then in Magaspi, this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the correct docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court. In the said case, there was an honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee because the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also one, for damages, the SC upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages alleged in the amended complaint as against the assessment of the trial court which was based on the damages alleged in the original complaint.

However, SC overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, etc.. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff. Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this Court held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes there was no such original complaint duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were declared null and void.

The facts and circumstances of the present case are similar to Manchester. The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.

However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee untill the case was decided by the SC on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.

In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.

Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same.

Thus, the Court rules as follows:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs.