Republic vs Remman Enterprises (Civil Law)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO

G.R. No. 199310; February 19, 2014; REYES, J.

FACTS:

On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises filed an application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated in Taguig, Metro Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.

The RTC found the application for registration sufficient in form and substance and set it for initial hearing on May 30, 2002. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette and was likewise posted in a conspicuous places.

On the day of the hearing, only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the respondent’s application for registration. Sometime after, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) likewise filed its Opposition, alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

During the trial, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador and Bella Mijares, respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime, who cultivated and planted different kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989. The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the respondent; (2) survey plans of the subject properties; (3) technical descriptions of the subject properties; (4) Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate; (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; and (6) certifications dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno, Senior Forest Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain 

For its part, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application for registration should be denied since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic map of Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the then Department of National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.

On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual topographic survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. The RTC pointed out that LLDA’s claim that the elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay since the same was merely based on the topographic map that was prepared using an aerial survey on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was indeed conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the preparation of the topographic map. 

Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always remain the same; that the elevations of the subject properties may have already changed since 1966 when the supposed aerial survey, from which the topographic map used by LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the method used by Engr. Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the subject properties.

Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that the same could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas that can be covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not those that are already far from it, which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed out that the subject properties are more than a kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE:

Is respondent entitled to the registration of title to the subject properties?

HELD: NO

That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact by the lower courts, which this Court, generally may not disregard. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so. That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily mean that they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

While deference is due to the lower courts’ finding that the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake, the Court nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to the subject properties.

"Under the Regalian Doctrine, xxxx all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable."

The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Under said Section, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: 
1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; 
2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two certifications issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain "under Project No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968."

However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Court clarified that, in addition to the 1) certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must 2) prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They must 3) present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and 4) certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the records.

In Republic v. Roche, the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties. Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical description of the land which bears no information regarding the land’s classification. She did not bother to establish the status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.

The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its application for registration are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the respondent to present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the application for registration in spite of the failure of the respondent to prove by well-nigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are alienable and disposable.

Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court form part of the law of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent points out that its application for registration of title was filed and was granted by the RTC prior to the Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties. 

The Court does not agree.

Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration was filed and granted by RTC prior to the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the present case; it is not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary that the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect. "Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one."

Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject properties since 1943, the respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena which are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession and occupation of the subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to present any other evidence to prove the character of the possession and occupation by it and its predecessors-in-interest of the subject properties.

For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.

Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have indeed planted crops on the subject properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject properties have been possessed and occupied by them in the manner contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation, which is not the possession and occupation required by law.

"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years."

Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership." That the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or possession of the subject properties starting that year. 

WHEREFORE, respondent's application for registration is denied.