Wednesday, July 30, 2014

Du vs Stronghold Insurance (Remedial Law)

DU V. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE
G.R. No. 156580 | JUNE 14, 2004
FACTS:
Sometime in January 1989, Aurora De Leon sold a parcel of land registered in her name to Luz Du under a ‘Conditional Deed of Sale’ for a down payment of P75,000.00 leaving a balance of P95,000.00.
On April 28, 1989, Aurora de Leon sold the same property to spouses Enrique and Rosita Caliwag without prior notice to Luz Du. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2200 was issued in favor of the Caliwag spouses.
Meanwhile, Stronghold Insurance Corp., Inc. filed a civil case against the Caliwag spouses and other persons, for allegedly defrauding Stronghold and misappropriating the company’s fund by falsifying and simulating purchases of documentary stamps.  The action was accompanied by a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment duly annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2200 on August 7, 1990.
On her part, on December 21, 1990, Luz Du initiated an action against Aurora de Leon and the spouses Caliwag for the annulment of the sale by De Leon in favor of the Caliwags, anchored on the earlier mentioned Deed of Conditional Sale. On January 3, 1991, Luz Du caused the annotation of a Notice Of Lis Pendens at the back of TCT No. 2200.
On February 11, 1991, the court where the Stronghold case was filed ruled in favor of Stronghold, ordering the spouses Caliwag jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff P8,691,681.60, among others.  When the decision became final and executory, on March 12, 1991, a notice of levy on execution was annotated on TCT No. 2200 and the attached property was sold in a public auction.  On August 5, 1991, the certificate of sale and the final Deed of Sale in favor of Stronghold were inscribed and annotated leading to the TCT No. 6444 in the name of Stronghold.
It came to pass that on August 5, 1992, Luz Du too was able to secure a favorable judgment in Civil Case No. 60319 and which became final and executory sometime in 1993, as well. Thus, Luz Du commenced the present action to cancel the TCT No. 6444 with damages claiming priority rights over the property by virtue of her Notice Of Lis Pendens under Entry No. 13305 and inscribed on January 3, 1991, and the final and executory decision in he civil case she filed against spouses Caliwag.
According to Luz Du, despite her said notice of lis pendens annotated, Stronghold still proceeded with the execution of the decision in the other civil case against the subject lot and ultimately the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6444 in its (Stronghold’s) name.
The trial court ruled that Stronghold had superior rights over the property because of the prior registration of the latter’s notice of levy on attachment on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2200.  For this reason, it found no basis to nullify TCT No. 6444, which was issued in the name of respondent after the latter had purchased the property in a public auction.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto and held that notice of levy on attachment had been registered almost 5 months before petitioner’s notice of lis pendens.

ISSUE:
Whether a Notice of Levy on Attachment on the property is a superior lien over that of the unregistered right of a buyer of a property in possession pursuant to a Deed of Conditional Sale

WON the acquisition of the subject property by Respondent Stronghold was tainted with bad faith

HELD:
1) Yes.
*Preference is given to a duly registered attachment over a subsequent notice of lis pendens, even if the beneficiary of the notice acquired the subject property before the registration of the attachment. Under the torrens system, the auction sale of an attached realty retroacts to the date the levy was registered. In this case of Tambao v. Suy, 52 Phil. 237, it has been held that “Where a preliminary attachment in favour of ‘A’ was recorded earlier, and the private sale of the attached property in favour of ‘B’ was executed a year later, the attachment lien has priority over the private sale, which means that the purchaser took the property subject to such attachment lien and to all of its consequences, one of which is the subsequent sale on execution.”
The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the subsequent registration of the prior sale. In Capistrano v. PNB, if the attachment or levy of execution, though posterior to the sale, is registered before the sale is registered, it takes a precedence over the latter. “The rule is not altered by the fact that at the time of the execution sale the Philippine National Bank had information that the land levied upon had already been deeded by the judgment debtor and his wife to Capistrano. The auction sale being necessary sequel to the levy, for this was effected precisely to carry out the sale, the purchase made by the bank at said auction should enjoy the same legal priority that the levy had over the sale in favour of plaintiff. In other words, the auction sale retroacts to the date of the levy. Were the rule otherwise, the preference enjoyed by the levy of execution in a case like the present would be meaningless and illusory.”

2) No

*Good faith: Defense in registration of attachment. It is settled that a person dealing with registered property may rely on the title and be charged with notice of only such burdens and claims as are annotated thereon. This principle applies with more force to this case, absent any allegation or proof that Stronghold had actual knowledge of the sale to petitioner before the registration of its attachment. Thus, the annotation of respondent’s notice of attachment was a registration in good faith, the kind that made its prior right enforceable.


*taken from www.scribd.com/doc/110773918/BSL-CASE-DOCTRINES-IN-CIVIL-PROCEDURE-BRONDIAL

Chuidian vs Sandiganbayan (Remedial Law)

Vicente CHUIDIAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN and the Republic
G.R. No. 1339941 | JANUARY 19, 2001
(modes of quashal of the writ of attachment)
FACTS:
In September 1980, Chuidian allegedly a dummy of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, was able to obtain, allegedly under false pretenses, a loan guarantee from Philguarantee Corp., the BOI and the Central Bank, in favor of the Asian Reliability Co. Inc. (ARCI). ARCI, 98% of which was allegedly owned by Chuidian, was granted a loan guarantee of US $25M for the establishment of 5 inter-related projects in the country.
However, Chuidian used the same in investing in corporations operating in the US. ARCI then defaulted in the payments of the loan, compelling Philguarantee to undertake payments for the same. Philguarantee sued Chuidian before a Californian court, charging him of violating the terms of the loan, defaulting in payments and misusing the proceeds for his personal benefit. Chuidian claimed that he himself was a victim of the systematic plunder perpetrated by the Marcoses.
On November 1985, Philguarantee entered into a compromise agreement with Chuidian whereby Chuidian shall assign and surrender title to all his companies in favor of the Phil. Gov’t.  In return, Philguarantee shall absolve Chuidian from all civil and criminal liability concerning the payments Philguarantee had made on Chuidian’s defaulted loans. It was further stipulated that the Phil. government shall pay Chuidian the amount of US $5.3M. Chuidian received the 1st two installments of the payment. The remaining balance of US $4.6M was to be paid through an irrevocable Letter of Credit (L/C) from which Chuidian would draw US $100k monthly.

With the advent of the Aquino administration, the newly-established PCGG exerted earnest efforts to search and recover properties and assets suspected as having been illegally acquired by the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. Chuidian was among those whose assets were sequestered by the PCGG.  The PNB was directed to place the letters of credit under its custody, in behalf of the PCGG.

In the meantime, Philguarantee filed a motion before the Superior Court of California, seeking to vacate the stipulated judgment containing the settlement between Philguarantee and Chuidian on the grounds that: (a) Philguarantee was compelled by the Marcos administration to agree to the terms of the settlement; (b) Chuidian blackmailed Marcos into pursuing the settlement agreement by threatening to expose the fact that the Marcoses made investments in Chuidian’s American enterprises; and (c) the Aquino administration had ordered Philguarantee not to make further payments on the L/C to Chuidian.  However, the Californian court concluded that Philguarantee was not able to sufficiently show that the settlement should be set aside. On appeal, the CA of the State of California affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court denying Philguarantee’s motion.
Chuidian filed before the California Central District Court, an action against PNB seeking to compel the latter to pay the proceeds of the L/C. Philguarantee intervened in said action, raising the same issues and arguments it had earlier raised in the action before the Santa Clara Superior Court, alleging that PNB was excused from making payments on the L/C since the settlement was void due to illegality, duress and fraud.
The Federal Court rendered judgment ruling:  (1) in favor of PNB excusing the said bank from making payment on the L/C; and (2) in Chuidian’s favor by denying intervenor Philguarantee’s action to set aside the settlement agreement.

Meanwhile a Deed of Transfer was executed between then Sec. of Finance and then PNB President Edgardo Espiritu, to facilitate the rehabilitation of PNB. Thus, the gov’t assumed all liabilities of PNB including the L/C listed in favor of Chuidian in the amount of US $4.4M

On July 1987, the gov’t filed before the Sandiganbayan a civil case against the Marcos spouses, several gov’t officials, and a number of individuals known to be cronies of the Marcoses, including Chuidian, seeking the reconveyance, accounting and restitution of all forms of wealth allegedly procured illegally by the defendants. 
While the case was pending, the Republic filed a motion for issuance of a writ of attachment over the L/C in the name of Chuidian, citing as grounds therefor the following:
(1) Chuidian embezzled or fraudulently misapplied the funds of ARCI acting in a fiduciary capacity, justifying issuance of the writ under Section 1(b), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The writ is justified under Section 1(d) of the same rule as Chuidian is guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action was brought, or that he concealed or disposed of the property that is the subject of the action;
(3) Chuidian has removed or disposed of his property with the intent of defrauding the plaintiff as justified under Section 1(c) of Rule 57; and
(4) Chuidian is residing out of the country or one on whom summons may be served by publication, which justifies the writ of attachment prayed for under Section 1(e) of the same rule.
The Republic also averred that should the action brought by Chuidian before the U.S. District Court of California to compel payment of the L/C prosper, inspite of the sequestration of the said L/C, Chuidian can ask the said foreign court to compel the PNB Los Angeles branch to pay the proceeds of the L/C.  Eventually, Philguarantee will be made to shoulder the expense resulting in further damage to the government.  Thus, there was an urgent need for the writ of attachment to place the L/C under the custody of the Sandiganbayan so the same may be preserved as security for the satisfaction of judgment in the case before said court.

Chuidian opposed the motion for issuance of the writ of attachment, contending that:
(1) The plaintiff’s affidavit appended to the motion was in form and substance fatally defective;
(2) Section 1(b) of Rule 57 does not apply since there was no fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and Chuidian;
(3) While Chuidian does not admit fraud on his part, if ever there was breach of contract, such fraud must be present at the time the contract is entered into;
(4) Chuidian has not removed or disposed of his property in the absence of any intent to defraud plaintiff;
(5) Chuidian’s absence from the country does not necessarily make him a non-resident; and
(6) Service of summons by publication cannot be used to justify the issuance of the writ since Chuidian had already submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court by way of a motion to lift the freeze order filed through his counsel.

On July 1993, the Sandiganbayan ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment against the L/C as security for the satisfaction of judgment. The Sandiganbayan ruled:
1) Although there was no separate was attached to the motion, the motion itself contained all the requisites of an affidavit, and the verification thereof is deemed a substantial compliance of Rule 57, Section 3.
2) Fiduciary relationship exists between Chuidian and ARCI but not with the Republic. Hence, the Republic cannot invoke Sec. 1(b) of Rule 57.
3) There was a prima facie case of fraud committed by Chuidian, justifying the issuance of the writ of attachment.  
4) The Sandiganbayan also adopted the Republic’s position that since it was compelled to pay, through Philguarantee, the bank loans taken out by Chuidian, the proceeds of which were fraudulently diverted, it is entitled to the issuance of the writ of attachment to protect its rights as creditor.
5) Chuidian’s absence from the country was considered by the Sandiganbayan to be the most compelling ground for the issuance of the writ.

Almost four (4) years after the issuance of the order of attachment, Chuidian filed a motion to lift the attachment based on the following grounds:  
1) He had returned to the Philippines, and considering that his absence was the most compelling ground for the issuance of the writ, the latter should be lifted.
2) There was no evidence at all of initial fraud or subsequent concealment except for the affidavit submitted by the PCGG Chairman whose statement is hearsay since he was not a witness to the litigated incidents, was never presented as a witness by the Republic and thus was not subject to cross-examination.
3) He denies that he ever disposed of his assets to defraud the Republic, and there is nothing in the records that support the Sandiganbayan’s erroneous conclusion on the matter. 
4) He was never a defendant in any other pending criminal action.
5) He was not guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation. L/C was not a product of fraudulent transactions but the result of court-approved settlement.
6) Should the attachment be allowed to continue, he will be deprived of his property without due process.  The L/C was payment to Chuidian in exchange for the assets he turned over to the Republic.  Said assets had already been sold by the Republic and cannot be returned to Chuidian should the government succeed in depriving him of the proceeds of the L/C.
7) Finally, throughout the 4 years that the preliminary attachment had been in effect, the gov’t had not set the case for hearing.  The case itself should be dismissed for laches owing to the Republic’s failure to prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time.  Accordingly, the preliminary attachment, being only a temporary or ancillary remedy, must be lifted and the PNB ordered to immediately pay the proceeds of the L/C to Chuidian.
The Republic opposed e motion and contended that allowing the foreign judgment as a basis for the lifting of the attachment would essentially amount to an abdication of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide the ill gotten wealth cases lodged before it in deference to the judgment of foreign courts.
The Sandganbayan denied petitioner’s motion and also the latter’s subsequent MR.

ISSUE:
WON the writ of preliminary attachment should be lifted as a result of petitioner’s return to the country and his averments that there was no fraud in incurring the obligation

HELD: No
*Preliminary attachment issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant’s cause of action. When the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant’s cause of action, the defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff’s application and affidavits on which the writ was based – and consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued – the reason being that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. In other words, the merits of the action would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular trial.

The merits of the action in which a writ of preliminary attachment has been issued are not triable on a motion for dissolution of the attachment; otherwise an applicant for the lifting of the writ could force a trial of the merits of the case on a mere motion.


There are only two ways of quashing a writ of attachment: (a) by filing a counterbound immediately; or (b) by moving to quash on the ground of improper and irregular issuance. These grounds for the dissolution of an attachment are fixed in Rule 57 of the Rules of Court and the power of the Court to dissolve an attachment is circumscribed by the grounds specified therein. Petitioner’s motion to lift attachment failed to demonstrate any infirmity or defect in the issuance of the writ of attachment; neither did he file a counterbond.

*SC ruling taken from www.scribd.com/doc/110773918/BSL-CASE-DOCTRINES-IN-CIVIL-PROCEDURE-BRONDIAL

Mangila vs CA (Remedial Law)

Anita MANGILA V. CA and Loreta Guina
G.R. No. 125027 | AUGUST 12, 2002
FACTS:
Anita Mangila is an exporter of seafoods and doing business under the name of Seafoods Products. Private respondent Loreta Guina is the President and General Manager of Air Swift International, a single registered proprietorship engaged in the freight forwarding business.
In January 1988, Mangila contracted the freight forwarding services of Guina for shipment of petitioner’s products, such as crabs, prawns and assorted fishes, to Guam (USA) where petitioner maintains an outlet. Mangila agreed to pay cash on delivery. Guina’s invoice stipulates a charge of 18 percent interest per annum on all overdue accounts, and in case of suit, stipulates attorney’s fees equivalent to 25 percent of the amount due plus costs of suit.
On the first shipment, Mangila requested for 7 days within which to pay private Guina. However, for the next three shipments, March 17, 24 and 31, 1988, petitioner failed to pay private respondent shipping charges amounting to P109, 376.95.
Despite several demands, Mangila never paid. Thus, on June 10, 1988, Guina filed before the RTC Pasay City an action for collection of sum of money.
The Sheriff’s Return showed that summons was not served on Mangila. A woman found at Mangila’s house informed the sheriff that petitioner transferred her residence to Guagua, Pampanga. The sheriff found out further that petitioner had left the Philippines for Guam.
Thus, on September 1988, construing petitioner’s departure from the Philippines as done with intent to defraud her creditors, Ginua filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment, which the court subsequently granted. A Writ of Preliminary Attachment was thereafter issued.
Through the assistance of the sheriff of RTC Pampanga, the Notice of Levy with the Order, Affidavit and Bond was served on Mangila’s household help in San Fernando, Pampanga on October 1988.
 On November 1988, Mangila filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment without submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. She pointed out that up to then, she had not been served a copy of the Complaint and the summons. Hence, petitioner claimed the court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person.
After the hearing on the motion, RTC granted the same on January 13, 1989 upon filing of petitioner’s counter-bond. The trial court, however, did not rule on the question of jurisdiction and on the validity of the writ of preliminary attachment.
Thereafter, Guina applied for an alias summons and on January 26, 1989 summons was finally served on petitioner.
On February 1989, Mangila moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue, claiming that as stipulated in the invoice of Guina’s freight services, the venue in case a complaint is filed would be in Makati and not Pasay. For her part, Guina explained that although “Makati” appears as the stipulated venue, the same was merely an inadvertence by the printing press whose general manager executed an affidavit admitting such inadvertence. Moreover, Guina claimed that Mangila knew that private respondent was holding office in Pasay City and not in Makati.
The RTC ave credence to Guina’s Opposition, denied the Motion to Dismiss, and gave petitioner 5 days to file her Answer. Petitioner filed an MR but this too was denied. Thus she filed her Answer on June 1989, maintaining her contention that the venue was improperly laid.
The case was set for pre-trial. Meanwhile, Guina filed a Motion to Sell Attached Properties but the trial court denied the motion.
On motion of Mangila, the RTC reset the pre-trial but Mangila failed to appear on the rescheduled date. Without declaring Mangila to be in default, the court allowed Guina to present evidence ex parte.
Mangila filed an MR of the order terminating the pre-trial, and argued that there was no order decalring him in default and that his attorney was only late but not absent during the rescheduled pre-trial.
Nevertheless, the RTC ruled in favor of Guina and ordered petitioner to pay respondent P109,376.95 plus 18 percent interest per annum, 25 percent attorney’s fees and costs of suit. Mangila appealed to the CA while Guina filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal but the trial court denied the same.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the issuance of the writ of attachment and sustained the filing of the action in the RTC of Pasay. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the declaration of default on petitioner and concluded that the trial court did not commit any reversible error.

ISSUES: 
WON the CA erred in affirming the validity of the issuance of the writ of Preliminary Attachment

WON the venue was improperly laid

HELD: 
1) Yes, because there was no proper service of summons, order, and the writ of attachment.

*Improper Issuance and Service of Writ of Attachment. In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified the actual time when jurisdiction should be had:
“It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant – issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment – these do not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the court’s authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicant’s affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint xxx.”
Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.

2) Yes.

*Improper Venue. The Rules of Court provide that parties to an action may agree in writing on the venue on which an action should be brought. However, a mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. Thus, absent words that show the parties’ intention to restrict the filing of a suit in a particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any venue, as long as jurisdictional requirements are followed. Venue stipulations in a contract, while considered valid and enforceable, do not as a rule supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, they should be considered merely as an agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
In the instant case, the stipulation does not limit the venue exclusively to Makati. There are no qualifying or restrictive words in the invoice that would evince the intention of the parties that Makati is the “only or exclusive” venue where the action could be instituted. We therefore agree with private respondent that Makati is not the only venue where this could be filed.

The case was dismissed without prejudice.

*digest of the ruling taken from http://www.scribd.com/doc/110773918/BSL-CASE-DOCTRINES-IN-CIVIL-PROCEDURE-BRONDIAL