Sun Insurance vs Asuncion (Remedial Law)

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION (Judge, RTC Quezon City) and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG

G.R. Nos. 79937-38; February 13, 1989; GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS:  On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance filed a complaint with the RTC Makati for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period.

On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the RTC QC for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, initially against petitioner Sun Insurance, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint docketed as Civil Case Q-41177 sought, among others, the payment of damages. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about P50 Million.

Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together with 22 other cases assigned to different branches of the RTC QC which were under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to the SC. The SC ordered that the cases be re-raffled, the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.

Thus, Judge Solano, to whose sala Civil Case Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, instructed the Clerk of Court to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate. On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On August 30,1984, an amended complaint was filed by private respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated.

Respondent Judge Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution of the SC since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered. Private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than P10 Million as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70.

On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance with the SC Resolution and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent's claim of "not less than P10 M as actual and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion.

On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20 M as damages so the total claim amounts to about P65 Million. Seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00.

On August 13, 1987, the CA denied the petition insofar as it seeks annulment of the order, and petitioner’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Hence, the instant petition.

During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988.

ISSUE:

Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 even if there was nonpayment of the correct and proper docket fee?

Petitioners’ contention: Considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. As basis, petitioners cite Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA:

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.

Respondent’s contention: Manchester cannot apply retroactively for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no such ruling as yet. Magaspi v. Ramolete applies wherein it was held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.

HELD: YES, the court acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Nevertheless, the contention that Manchester cannot retroactively apply is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, this Court held that the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. Plaintiff-appellant deposited the deficiency in the docket fee outside the 15-day reglementary period for appeal. Thus, the CFI (as appellate court) did not acquire jurisdiction as the appeal was not perfected.

In Lee vs. Republic, the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in 1956. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the filing of petitioner's declaration of intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.

In Malimit vs. Degamo, the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an original petition for quo warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the CFI, within the one-week period after the proclamation as provided therefor by law. However, the required docket fees were paid only after the expiration of said period. Consequently, this Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date when it was mailed.

Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must be paid before a court will act on a petition or complaint. However, we also held that said rule is not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same decedent as he is not required to file a separate action for each will but instead he may have other wills probated in the same special proceeding then pending before the same court.

Then in Magaspi, this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the correct docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court. In the said case, there was an honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee because the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also one, for damages, the SC upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages alleged in the amended complaint as against the assessment of the trial court which was based on the damages alleged in the original complaint.

However, SC overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, etc.. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff. Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this Court held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes there was no such original complaint duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were declared null and void.

The facts and circumstances of the present case are similar to Manchester. The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.

However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee untill the case was decided by the SC on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.

In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.

Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same.

Thus, the Court rules as follows:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs. 

Serana vs Sandiganbayan (Remedial Law)

Hannah Serana

v.

 Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

FACTS:

Serana was a senior student of UP-Cebu who was also appointed by Pres. Estrada as student regent of UP to serve a one-year term from Jan.1, 2000 to Dec. 31, 2000. On Sept. 2000, petitioner together with her siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc (OSFRI). On of the projects of the OSFRI was the renovation of Vinzons Hall in UP Diliman, and Pres. Estrada gave P15M as financial assistance for the said project. The source of funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.

However, the renovation failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent and system-wide alliances of students conseguently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Ombudsman. After due investigation, the Ombudsman instituted a criminal case against Serana and her brother, charging them of Estafa.

Serana moved to quash the Information, contending that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the offense charged nor over her person in her capacity as UP student regent. She contends that Estafa falls under Crimes Against Property and not on the chapter on Crimes Committed by Public Officers, only over which, she argues, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Furthermore, she argues that it was not the governement that was duped, but Pres. Estrada, because the money came from the Office of the President and not from government funds. As to jurisdiction over her person, she contends that as a UP student regent, she is not a public officer since she merely represents her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity.

The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged and over Serana

HELD:

YES. Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan; Crime of Estafa. Plainly, estafa is one of those felonies within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin requirements that: 1) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of PD No. 1606, as amended, and that; 2) The offense is committed in relation to their office.

It is well-established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Delegation of sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.

A UP Student Regent is a Public Officer. A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed or enduring at the pleasure of the power, an individual is interested with some portion of sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers Board of Regents. The Sandiganbayan, also has jurisdiction over the other officers enumerated in PD No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, the SC held that while the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary grade 27 and higher but who are by express provisions of law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors and trustees, or manager of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities, or educational foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents performs functions similar to those of a board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606.

Liga ng Mga Barangay vs Atienza, Jr (Remedial Law)

THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL

vs.

 THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA

G.R. No. 154599             January 21, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines which pursuant to the Local Govt Code, constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, Metro Manila chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters. On March 2000, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws. Pursuant to its Constitution, it also adopted and ratified its own Election Code. Thereafter, it came out with its calendar of activities and guidelines for the implementation of its election code. The synchronized elections for highly-urbanized city chapters was also set on Oct. 21, 2002.

On June 28, 2002, respondent City Council of Manila enacted an ordinance providing among other things, for the election of representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters 30 days after the barangay elections.

Upon being informed that the ordinance had been forwarded to Mayor Atienza for his approval, the Liga sent him a letter requesting that said ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached upon or even assumed the functions of the Liga through legislation. However, Atienza stillapproved and signed the ordinance, and issued an executive order for its implementation.

This prompted the Liga to file a petition for certiorari with the SC. Respondents defend the validity of the assailed ordinance and executive order and prays for the dismissal of the petition on the ff grounds: 1) certiorari under Rule 65 is unavailing; 2) two actions were pending before the RTC Manila questioning the ordinance and executive order; 3) petitioner is guilty of forum shopping; 4) act sought to be enjoined is fait accompli; and 5) the city council does not fall within the ambit of “tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions”

ISSUE:

WON the City Council of Manila and Atienza committed grave abuse of discretion when they enacted and approved the ordinance purposely to govern the elections of the Manila Chapter of the Liga, and which provides a different manner of electing its officers, despite the fact that the law mandates such elections to be governed by the Liga Constitution and By-laws

HELD:

The SC ruled that the action, in its essence, seeks to declare the unconstitutionality/illegality of the ordinance. Thus it partakes of an action for declaratory relief of which the SC has only appellate and not original jurisdiction.

Rule on Hierarchy of Courts. The concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken, as according to parties seeking any of the writs, an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which the application therefore will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. The hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for issuance of extraordinary writs against the first level (inferior) courts should be filed with RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue the writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is an established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention, which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prvent further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.

Forum Shopping; Exists if elements of Litits Pendentia are present. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites must be present: 1) identity of the parties, or at least such parties as are representing the same interest in both actions; 2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; 3) identity with respect to the @ preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.

Requisites for filing of a Writ of Certiorari. For the Writ of Certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: 1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; 2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and 3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Escobal vs Garchitorena (Remedial Law)

ARNEL ESCOBAL  

vs.  

HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, xxx, Hon. David C. Naval, RTC Judge

(jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan vis-à-vis of the RTC)

G.R. No. 124644; February 5, 2004; CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Escobal is a graduate of the PMA, a member of the AFP and the Philippine Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at a café bar and restaurant in Naga City when he somehow got involved with a shooting incident that resulted to the death of Rodney Nueca.

Escobal was preventively suspended from the service. When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers. RTC denied the motion.

Trial proceeded. The prosecution rested its case and petitioner presented his evidence. On July 20, 1994, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the case. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., he argued that since he committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The RTC dismissed the motion but ordered the conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his office as a member of the PNP.

On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the performance of his official function. The trial court added that nonetheless, upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975, the issue had become moot and academic since the amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC. The petitioner did not have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof.

The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion and R.A. No. 7975, and to include therein an allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.

The petitioner filed a MR of the said order, reiterating that based on his testimony and those of his witnesses, the offense charged was committed by him in relation to his official functions. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively.

The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same to the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan returned the records of the case to the RTC, contending that the latter has jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:

Whether the case falls in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or of the RTC

HELD:

The case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 ….

For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect.

Under Sec. 2 of said law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.

The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law, which may be applied retroactively.

Gonzaga vs CA (Remedial Law)

SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA 

vs.

CA, HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR, and LUCKY HOMES, INC.

G.R. No. 144025; December 27, 2002; CORONA, J.:

FACTS:

Sometime in 1970, Sps. Gonzaga purchased a parcel of land from private respondent Lucky Homes, Inc., situated in Iloilo and containing an area of 240 square meters. Said lot was specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 under a TCT and was mortgaged to the Social Security System (SSS) as security for their housing loan.

Petitioners then started the construction of their house, not on Lot No. 19 but on Lot No. 18, as Lucky Homes Inc mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error, private respondent informed petitioners of such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen their premises. Thus, petitioners continued with the construction of their house.

However, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from SSS. Consequently, Lot No. 19 was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners’ certificate of title was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of SSS.

Sps. Gonzaga then offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from Lucky Homes that their contract of sale be reformed and another deed of sale be executed with respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their house was built therein. However, private respondent refused. This prompted petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an action for reformation of contract and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 36.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It held that when Lot No. 19 was foreclosed and sold at public auction, the reformation, or the swapping of Lot 18 and Lot 19, was no longer feasible considering that Sps. Gonzaga were no longer the owners of Lot 19. Thus, Lucky Homes would be losing Lot 18 without any substitute therefore. Furthermore, the RTC ruled:

"The logic and common sense of the situation lean heavily in favor of the defendant. It is evident that what plaintiff had bought from the defendant is Lot 19 covered by TCT No. 28254 which parcel of land has been properly indicated in the instruments and not Lot 18 as claimed by the plaintiff. The contracts being clear and unmistakable, they reflect the true intention of the parties, besides the plaintiff failed to assail the contracts on mutual mistake, hence the same need no longer be reformed.”

A writ of execution was issued. The petitioners filed a motion to recall said writ on the ground that the RTC lack jurisdiction as pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), it was vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Consequently, Sps. Gonzaga filed a new complaint with the HLURB, and also a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The CA dismissed the petition, relying on the doctrine of estoppel laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.

ISSUE:

            WON the Sps Gonzaga are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC to try the case

HELD:

Yes. The SC held that the doctrine in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, as reiterated in numerous cases, is still controlling. In explaining the concept of jurisdiction by estoppel, the Court quoted its decision in said case, to wit:

"It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated–– obviously for reasons of public policy."

Furthermore, the Court said that it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of contract against private respondents. It must be noted that in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the court’s jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction ─ and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the court’s jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

Petition for review is denied.