Ty vs CA (Civil Law)

OFELIA P. TY

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES

G.R. No. 127406.  November 27, 2000

QUISUMBING, J.:

Respondent Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 1977, in Manila.  Then they had a church wedding on August 1977.  However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding was also declared void for lack of consent of the parties. Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Villanueva, Reyes wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, thru civil rites on April 4, 1979 in Pasay. Three years after, on April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati.

On January 1991, Edgardo filed a case with the RTC of Pasig, praying that his marriage to Ofelia Ty be declared null and void because they allegedly had no marriage license when they got married.  He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria.   The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979. 

Ofelia, in defending her marriage to private respondent, submitted their Marriage License which was issued in Cavite on April 3, 1979. He did not question this document when it was submitted in evidence. However, the fact that the civil marriage of Edgardo and Ofelia took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed.  It also appears indisputable that petitioner and respondent had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.

The Pasig RTC ruled in favor of Edgardo Reyes and declared his marriage to Ofelia Ty null and void ab initio. Both parties appealed to the CA, which subsequently affirmed the trial court’s decision.  It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted.  

ISSUE:

1) Is a decree of nullity of the first marriage required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly?

2) May the Family Code be given retroactive effect to the instant case?

3) What is the effect of re-using for a church wedding the marriage license that was 1^st used in a civil wedding 3 years ago?

4) Is petitioner entitled to moral damages as indemnity for her husband’s filing of a baseless complaint?

HELD:

1) and 2) NO.

The SC held different rulings regarding the matter however, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. The rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage –

Art. 40.  The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases.  In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993), the Court held:

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.  A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.  (Art. 39 of the Family Code).  Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.  (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).

However, Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case.  The first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage.  The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant.  On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon.  We held that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel.  At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendozaand Aragon.  The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage.  In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.  As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights.  In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent.  

3) Coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage.  As petitioner contends, the CA erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial.  She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and weight.  She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality.  

In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first.

4) No damages should be awarded in the present case. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting.  She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents.   Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds.  To do so, would make the application of the law absurd.  Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity.  Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation. There are other remedies (legal separation, or prosecution for adultery or concubinage).