On the people's right to initiative (Political Law)

Legislative power is lodged in the Legislative Department. Local government units may exercise such power only thru a delegation from the Congress. However, the exception to this is the expressed reservation in favor of the people, found in Art. VI, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution. This refers to the people's right to initiative.

Art. VI, Sec. 32 - Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least 10 per centum of the total number of registered voters , of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3 per centum of the registered voters thereof.

Considering that the above-cited provision directs the Congress to enact a law for the creation of a system of initiative and referendum, such provision is not self-executing. Consequently, Congress indeed enacted a law - Republic Act No. 6735 or the People's Initiative and Referendum Act.

In Santiago vs COMELEC, RA 6735 was declared to have failed to provide a procedure to enable the non self-executing provision of Art. XVII, Sec.2 of the Constitution. The said statute only refers to amendments of national and local legislations. Hence, the right of the people to propose amendments of the Constitution still remains non self-executing.


The Lambino Case's main thrust is the difference between a revision and an amendment of the Constitution. There is no need to revisit the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC.

Magallona vs. Hon. Ermita, et al. (Political Law)

Magallona vs. Hon. Ermita, et al.

 G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

• Baseline laws, such as R.A. 9522, are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III-States-parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. It gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States-parties exercise treaty bases rights (right of sovereignty; right to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitation laws; right to exploit resources).

• UNCLOS III and its ancillary baseline laws play no role in the acquisition or diminution of territory, because under traditional international law typology, states acquire or lose territory through occupation, accretion, cession, and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the standard of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with treaty terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.'

• Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. However, the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over such islands was committed to text through RA 9522’s use of the framework of Regime of Islands, under which islands located at an ‘appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago’ generate their own applicable maritime zones. Such classification of the KIG and Scarborough Shoal made by the Congress manifests the Philippines’ compliance with its pacta sunt servanda obligation under the UNCLOS III.

• The fact of sovereignty does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty.

•  UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space – the exclusive economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas.

Province of North Cotabato vs. Gov’t of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel (Political Law)

Province of North Cotabato vs. Gov’t of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel

G.R. No. 183591; October 2008

• An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state (the associate) delegates certain responsibilities to the other (the principal), while maintaining its international status as a state.

• The concept of ‘association’ is not recognized under the 1987 Constitution. The Constitution does not contemplate any state in its jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS (Political Law)

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS

G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997

• If a law or contract violates any norm of the Constitution, that law or contract is null and void, and without any force and effect.

• Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

• Provisions of the Constitution are presumed to be self-executing unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate.

• A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the Constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

CIty of Manila vs Judge Colet (Taxation Law)

City of Manila, et al vs. Judge Colet, and Malaysian Airline System 

G.R. No. 120051, December 10, 2014

FACTS:

The case involves 10 consolidated petitions involving several corporations operating as “transportation contractors, persons who transport passenger or freight for hire, and common carriers by land, air or water” with principal offices in Metro Manila, and City of Manila’s Ordinance No. 7807 which amended Sec. 21 (B) of the Manila Revenue Code. Sec.21 (B) imposed business tax on “transportation contractors, persons who transport passenger or freight for hire, and common carriers by land, air or water”; while the subject ordinance amended such by lowering the tax rate from 3% per annum to .5% per annum. The City of Manila, through its City Treasurer, began imposing and collecting the business tax under Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, beginning January 1994.

Because they were assessed and/or compelled to pay business taxes pursuant to Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code before they were issued their business permits for 1994, several corporations questioned the constitutionality of Sec. 21 (B) for being contrary to the Constitution and the Local Government Code, and asked for the refund of what they had paid as business tax.

The City of Manila, argued that it was constitutional and valid; and such position was adopted by the RTC and the CA when the case reached the respective fora. The City argued that the enactment of Sec. 21 (B) is based on the exempting clause found at the beginning of Sec. 133, in conjunction with Section 143(h), of the LGC. 

SEC. 133.  Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. –

Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:

x x x x

(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Code;

SEC. 143. Tax on Business. – The municipality may impose taxes on the following businesses:

x x x x

(h) On any business, not otherwise specified in the preceding paragraphs, which the sanggunian concerned may deem proper to tax: Provided, That on any business subject to the excise, value-added or percentage tax under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, the rate of tax shall not exceed two percent (2%) of gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year.

The sanggunian concerned may prescribe a schedule of graduated tax rates but in no case to exceed the rates prescribed herein. (Emphases supplied by the Supreme Court)

ISSUE:

Is Sec. 21 (B) of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, unconstitutional?

HELD:

Yes. The power to tax is not inherent in LGUs to whom the power must be delegated by Congress and must be exercised within the guidelines and limitations that Congress may provide. 

Sec. 5 of Article X of the Constitution granted LGUs the “power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide...” In conformity with said constitutional provision, the Local Gov’t Code was enacted by Congress.

Sec. 130 of the LGC provides for the fundamental principles governing the taxing powers of LGUs. Sec. 133 provides for the common limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs. Among the common limitations on the taxing power of LGUs is Section 133(j) of the LGC, which states that “unless otherwise provided herein,” the taxing power of LGUs shall not extend to “taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Code.”

Section 133(j) of the LGC clearly and unambiguously proscribes LGUs from imposing any tax on the gross receipts of transportation contractors, persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water.  Yet, confusion arose from the phrase “unless otherwise provided herein,” found at the beginning of the said provision, and the City of Manila anchors the validity of Sec. 21 (B) on said phrase.

However, the Court is not convinced with the City’s contention.  Sec. 133(j) of the LGC prevails over Sec. 143(h) of the same Code, and Sec. 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, was manifestly in contravention of the former.

Sec. 133(j) of the LGC is a specific provision that explicitly withholds from any LGU the power to tax the gross receipts of transportation contractors, common carriers, persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water.   In contrast, Sec. 143 of the LGC defines the general power of the municipality (as well as the city, if read in relation to Section 151 of the same Code) to tax businesses within its jurisdiction. 

The succeeding proviso of Section 143(h) of the LGC, viz., “Provided, That on any business subject to the excise, value-added or percentage tax under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, the rate of tax shall not exceed two percent (2%) of gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year,” is not a specific grant of power to the municipality or city to impose business tax on the gross sales or receipts of such a business.  Rather, the proviso only fixes a maximum rate of imposable business tax in case the business taxed under Section 143(h) of the LGC happens to be subject to excise, value added, or percentage tax under the NIRC.

The omnibus grant of power to municipalities and cities under Section 143(h) of the LGC cannot overcome the specific exception/exemption in Section 133(j) of the same Code. 

In the case at bar, the sanggunian of the municipality or city cannot enact an ordinance imposing business tax on the gross receipts of transportation contractors, persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water, when said sanggunian was already specifically prohibited from doing so. 

Such construction gives effect to both Sections 133(j) and 143(h) of the LGC.  Also, Sec. 5(b) of the LGC itself, on Rules of Interpretation, provides that in case of doubt, any tax ordinance shall be construed strictly against the LGU enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Furthermore, such a construction is pursuant to the legislative intent to exclude from the taxing power of the LGU the imposition of business tax against common carriers to prevent a duplication of the so-called “common carrier’s tax.”

Nature, Effects, and Basis of Assessment (Taxation Law)

CIR vs. Sony Phils., Inc. (2010)

- An invalid Letter of Authority or an authorized revenue officer going beyond such authority results to an invalid assessment. A Letter of Authority should cover a period not exceeding one taxable year. If the audit of a taxpayer shall include more than one taxable period, either (a) the other periods or years shall be specifically indicated in the LoA or (b) the CIR must issue another LoA covering such period.

CIR vs. Pascor Realty and Dvpt. Corp. (1999)

- An assessment (FLDAN – Formal Letter of Demand and Assessment Notice) contains not only a computation of tax liabilities, but also a demand for payment within a prescribed period. It MUST STATE the facts, the law, rules and regulations, or jurisprudence on which the assessment id based, otherwise the FLDAN shall be void.

- It is a notice duly sent to a taxpayer, and signals the time when penalties and remedies (protest; prescription) begin to accrue against or for the latter. Thus, due process requires that it must be served on and received by the taxpayer, and that the latter must be certain that the document constitutes an assessment.

- An affidavit, which was executed by revenue officers stating a computation of the taxpayer’s tax liabilities and attached to a criminal complaint for tax evasion, cannot be deemed an assessment that can be questioned before the CTA.

CIR vs. Hantex Trading (2005)

-       The principle of “best evidence obtainable” envisaged in Sec. 6(B)of the 1997 NIRC includes:

a) corporate and accounting records of the taxpayer who is is the subject of the assessment process;

b) accounting records of other taxpayers engaged in the same line of business, including their gross profit and net profit sales;

c) data, record, paper, document or any evidence gathered by internal revenue officers from other taxpayers who had personal transactions with or from whom the subject taxpayer received any income;

d) record, data, document and information secured from government offices or agencies (ex. SEC, Central Bank, Bureau of Customs, Tariff and Customs Commission)

- The law allows the BIR access to all relevant or material records and data in the person of the taxpayer, in whatever form they may be kept. The standard is not the form but where it might shed light on the accuracy of the taxpayer’s return.

- Generally, administrative agencies such as the BIR are not bound by technical rules of evidence. Hence, it can accept documents, which cannot be admitted in a judicial proceeding where the Rules of Court are strictly observed (ex. hearsay evidence). It can choose to give weight or disregard such evidence, depending on their trustworthiness.

- However, this principle does NOT include photocopies of records or documents. Such photocopies have no probative value if offered as proof of the contents thereof nor as basis for any deficiency income or business taxes against a taxpayer.

- General Rule: in the absence of accounting records of a taxpayer, his tax liability may be determined by estimation. The BIR is not required to compute such tax liabilities with mathematical exactness, and to rule otherwise will be tantamount to ruling that skillful concealment is an invincible barrier to proof.

Exception: where the estimation is arrived at arbitrarily and capriciously

Sy Po vs. CTA and BIR (1988)

- The rule on the “best evidence obtainable” applies when a tax report required by law for the purpose of assessment is not available or when the tax return required by law is incomplete or fraudulent. In this case, the persistent failure of the petitioners to present their books of accounts for examination for the taxable years involved left the CIR no other legal option except to resort to the power conferred upon him under Sec. 6 (B) of the NIRC.

Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Judge Ruiz (1971)

-  Exception to the rule on “best evidence obtainable”: Notwithstanding the powers of the CIR, the taxpayers are still entitled to their constitutional right against illegal searches and seizures. Evidence obtained through illegal searches and seizures, when made the basis of an assessment, will render such assessment invalid.

-  In this case, the warrants sanctioning the seizure of all records of the petitioners, whatever their nature, contravened the explicit command of the Bill or Rights that the things to be seized must be particularly described. The language used in the warrants was all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of the petitioner corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative.

Fitness By Design, Inc. vs CIR

-  Consent of the taxpayer is not necessary for the procurement of his books of accounts in the exercise of the CIR’s access power provided in Sec.5 of the NIRC. To require such consent would defeat the law’s intent to help the BIR to assess and collect the correct amount of taxes.

-   In this case, Sablan, a colleague of petitioner’s former bookkeeper, became an informer to the CIR regarding the tax liability of petitioner. Petitioner alleges that Sablan illegally took custody of its accounting records, and submitted the same to the BIR without petitioner’s consent. 

Republic vs Remman Enterprises (Civil Law)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO

G.R. No. 199310; February 19, 2014; REYES, J.

FACTS:

On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises filed an application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated in Taguig, Metro Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.

The RTC found the application for registration sufficient in form and substance and set it for initial hearing on May 30, 2002. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette and was likewise posted in a conspicuous places.

On the day of the hearing, only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the respondent’s application for registration. Sometime after, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) likewise filed its Opposition, alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

During the trial, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador and Bella Mijares, respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime, who cultivated and planted different kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989. The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the respondent; (2) survey plans of the subject properties; (3) technical descriptions of the subject properties; (4) Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate; (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; and (6) certifications dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno, Senior Forest Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain 

For its part, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application for registration should be denied since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic map of Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the then Department of National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.

On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual topographic survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. The RTC pointed out that LLDA’s claim that the elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay since the same was merely based on the topographic map that was prepared using an aerial survey on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was indeed conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the preparation of the topographic map. 

Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always remain the same; that the elevations of the subject properties may have already changed since 1966 when the supposed aerial survey, from which the topographic map used by LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the method used by Engr. Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the subject properties.

Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that the same could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas that can be covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not those that are already far from it, which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed out that the subject properties are more than a kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE:

Is respondent entitled to the registration of title to the subject properties?

HELD: NO

That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact by the lower courts, which this Court, generally may not disregard. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so. That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily mean that they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

While deference is due to the lower courts’ finding that the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake, the Court nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to the subject properties.

"Under the Regalian Doctrine, xxxx all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable."

The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Under said Section, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: 
1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; 
2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two certifications issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain "under Project No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968."

However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Court clarified that, in addition to the 1) certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must 2) prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They must 3) present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and 4) certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the records.

In Republic v. Roche, the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties. Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical description of the land which bears no information regarding the land’s classification. She did not bother to establish the status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.

The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its application for registration are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the respondent to present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the application for registration in spite of the failure of the respondent to prove by well-nigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are alienable and disposable.

Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court form part of the law of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent points out that its application for registration of title was filed and was granted by the RTC prior to the Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties. 

The Court does not agree.

Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration was filed and granted by RTC prior to the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the present case; it is not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary that the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect. "Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one."

Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject properties since 1943, the respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena which are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession and occupation of the subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to present any other evidence to prove the character of the possession and occupation by it and its predecessors-in-interest of the subject properties.

For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.

Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have indeed planted crops on the subject properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject properties have been possessed and occupied by them in the manner contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation, which is not the possession and occupation required by law.

"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years."

Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership." That the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or possession of the subject properties starting that year. 

WHEREFORE, respondent's application for registration is denied.

Snippets and Doctrines of Cases on Legal Separation

Aida Bañez vs Gabriel Bañez – (2002)

- Multiple appeals may not be taken in an action for legal separation. To hold otherwise would constitute splitting a cause of action because a legal separation case involves only one cause of action. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties.  The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation. They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. 

Enrico Pacete, and Clarita De La Concepcion [2^nd wife] vs Hon. Carriaga Jr, and Concepcion Pacete [1^st wife] - (1994)

- Private respondent filed for an action for the declaration of absolute nullity of the marriage between petitioners, and for legal separation against Enrico. Petitioners were declared in default and a judgment by default was rendered in favor of private respondent.

- Marriage is a special contract and an inviolable institution to which the state is vitally interested Thus, the Rules of Court expressly proscribes the court from issuing default orders in cases of Legal Separation, Petition for Nullity of Marriage and Annulment of Marriage. Art. 101 (now Art. 60, FC) of the NCC expressly provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. Further, Art. 103 (Now Art. 58, FC) of the NCC requires that an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition” (six-months cooling – off period rule).

William Ong vs Lucita Ong – (2006)

- The SC is not a trier of facts. Both the CA and the court a quo concluded that based on the testimonies of a number of witnesses, including a doctor and Lucita’s sister, that indeed petitioner beat her and was grossly abusive to her and her children. Further, petitioner admitted that there was no day that he and Lucita did not fight and blamed the latter for her shortcomings as a wife.

Brigido Quiao vs Rita Quiao – (2012)

- Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code governs the dissolution and liquidation of the common properties of a couple who got married in 1977 (before the Family Code was enacted) and obtained a decree of legal separation when the Family Code is already in effect.

Snippets and Doctrines of Cases on Presumptive Death for Purposes of Remarriage Art. 41 Family Code

Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death for Purposes of Remarriage

Antonia Armas [sister of 2^nd husband] vs. Marietta Calisterio – (2000)

- Respondent contracted 2^nd marriage with Teodoro Calisterio, without securing a court declaration that her 1^st husband, who had been absent and whose whereabouts had been unknown for 11 years, was presumptively dead. When Teodoro died, his sister Antonia claimed that she was the sole heir, considering that the marriage between Teodoro and respondent is void for being bigamous.

- As to the validity of a subsequent marriage solemnized under the Civil Code (based on Art. 83, CC)

1) VOID unless 1^st marriage was annulled or dissolved;

2) VALID if 1^st spouse was absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive; if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than 7 years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage; if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. (“deemed valid until declared null and void by a competent court”)

- For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong — it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. The Court does not find these circumstances to be here extant.

- A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence (7 years) is met. Respondent’s 2^nd marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the 1^st husband (James Bounds).

Republic vs Gregorio Nolasco [the seaman with British wife] – (1993)

- The requirement in Art. 41 of the FC, that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is dead, was not satisfied. Nolasco’s efforts (searching for her whenever his ship docked in England; sending her letters which were all returned to him; and inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless) to locate his wife was insufficient and too sketchy to form a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. They only proved that his wife chose not to communicate with their common acquaintances.

Angelita Valdez vs Republic – (2009)

- The requirement of “well-founded belief of absent spouse’s death” provided in Art. 41 of the FC does not apply to marriages solemnized under the Civil Code. Neither is a judicial declaration of presumptive death necessary before the present spouse can contract a subsequent marriage; because the FC cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as it will impair vested rights. In the present case, if the FC will be applied, it will ultimately result to the invalidation of petitioner’s subsequent marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. What is only required under the CC is that (1) the former spouse had been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, (2) that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, (3) that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

- A judicial presumption of death, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. In the present case, death of the former husband was presumed to have taken place on the 7^th year of absence.

Republic vs Ferventino Tango – (2009)

- Appeal filed by the Republic is improper because under Art. 253 and 247 of the FC, actions filed under Art. 41 (for the declaration presumptive death) is a summary proceeding and the judgment therein shall be immediately final and executory. Thus, no appeal can be had. The remedy is a petition for certiorari.

- Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the SC's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

Republic vs Gloria Bermudez-Lorino – (2005)

- An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is immediately final and executory.  The right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege.  Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law (which includes the present action for declaration for presumptive death) are “immediately final and executory”, the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein.

- Difference between having the supposed appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the RTC decision sought to be appealed is immediately final and executory, and the denial of the appeal for lack of merit:  In the former, the supposed appellee can immediately ask for the issuance of an Entry of Judgment in the RTC, whereas, in the latter, the appellant can still raise the matter to the SC on petition for review and the RTC judgment cannot be executed until the SC makes the final pronouncement.

Republic vs Yolanda Granada – (2012)

- A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding as expressly provided by Art. 253 of the FC. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the FC provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory. It is unappeallable and thus, the remedy is a petition for certiorari.

- Art. 41 of the Family Code imposes more stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil Code. The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news that the absentee is still alive; or that the absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code provision prescribes a “well-founded belief” that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

- The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. Nevertheless, the belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.

Republic vs Maria Fe Cantor – (2013)

- Certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death under the FC.

- Declaration of presumptive death under Art. 41 of the FC imposes a stricter standard than that of Art. 83 of the Civil Code. Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief"

- The Strict Standard Approach is consistent with the State’s policy to protect and strengthen marriage. It is also for the benefit of the present spouse, to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy. Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the present spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively established. The decision of the competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively negated.