Morigo vs People (Civil Law)

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 145226             February 06, 2004
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at Tagbilaran City, Bohol, for a period of 4 years (from 1974-1978). After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. Lucia went to Canada for work but in 1990, she came back to the Philippines and proposed to petitioner appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Bohol. A week after, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce which was granted and took effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Lumbago at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City a year after, he filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia in RTC Bohol, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

On October 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City. Petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon MR by the prosecution. After trial, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment, finding petitioner guilty of bigamy. In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals, the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur, which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere.

Petitioner appealed to the CA. While the appeal was pending, the RTC in the civil case declared the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory. On the other hand, the CA affirmed the decision in the criminal case, finding no error in it, and that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People, allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith. The CA denied the motion for lack of merit. However, the denial was by a split vote. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid

HELD:

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.

The OSG contends that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.

Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that that the trial court in the civil case, found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Thus, it is but logical that a conviction for bigamy cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. We need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic. 

WHEREFORE, petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.