Heirs of Saez Sabanpan vs Comorposa (Remedial Law)

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN:  BERNARDO S. SABANPAN, RENE S. SABANPAN, DANILO S. SABANPAN and THELMA S. CHU; HEIRS OF ADOLFO SAEZ: MA. LUISA SAEZ TAPIZ, MA. VICTORIA SAEZ LAPITAN, MA. BELEN SAEZ and EMMANUEL SAEZ; and HEIRS OF CRISTINA SAEZ GUTIERREZ:  ROY SAEZ GUTIERREZ and LUIS SAEZ JR.

vs.

ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA, HERDIN C. COMORPOSA, OFELIA C. ARIEGO, REMEDIOS COMORPOSA, VIRGILIO A. LARIEGO, BELINDA M. COMORPOSA and ISABELITA H. COMORPOSA

G.R. No. 152807;  August 12, 2003;  PANGANIBAN, J.

--- The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative value.  Just because a piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute.

A Complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by [petitioners] against [respondents] before the MTC Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur, whereby it was alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of Lot No. 845, Land 275 located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur with an area of 1.2 hectares.  In 1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.

In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was terminated from his job. The termination of his employment caused a problem in relocating his house.  Being a close family friend of Marcos Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the late Marcos Saez’s son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband of Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Adolfo allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his neighbors and transferred to a portion of the land subject matter of this case. Francisco Comorposa occupied a the said portion of Marcos Saez’ property without paying any rental, and later when he left for Hawaii, USA, he was succeeded in his possession by the respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises through petitioners’ tolerance.

On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they were the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful possessors of the premises. A complaint was filed with the barangay office of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, but the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.

Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the complaint and alleged that they entered and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid and lawful claimants, possessors and owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up to the present time; that they have acquired just and valid ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription, and that the Regional Director of the DENR, Region XI had ruled that they were the rightful claimants and possessors, and therefore entitled to the issuance of a title.

The MTC ruled in favor of petitioners, but the RTC, on appeal, reversed the MTC Decision. The CA affirmed the RTC decision, and upheld the right of respondents as claimants and possessors.  The appellate court held that -- although not yet final -- the Order issued by the regional executive director of the DENR remained in full force and effect, unless declared null and void.  The CA added that the Certification issued by the DENR’s community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person. Thus, respondents had the better right to possess the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, because they have suffiently proven their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960.  The appellate court deemed as self-serving, and therefore incredible, the Affidavits executed by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel Oboza and Paulina Paran.

ISSUES:

1) WON the CA erred in giving credence to the Order issued by the regional executive director

2) WON the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s ruling giving weight to the CENR Officer’s Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda, and it is a new matter raised for the first time on appeal?

3) WON the CA erred in reaffirming the RTC when it did not give importance to the affidavits by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel [Oboza], and Paulina Paran for allegedly being self serving

4) WON petitioners are correct in their contention that prescription cannot apply in the present case because respondents’ possession of the land in question was allegedly only by tolerance

HELD:

1) NO. Under the Public Land Act, the management and the disposition of public land is under the primary control of the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau or LMB), subject to review by the DENR secretary. As a rule, then, courts have no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters properly falling within the powers of the LMB.

The powers given to the LMB and the DENR to alienate and dispose of public land does not, however, divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants to protect their respective possessions and occupations. The power to determine who has actual physical possession or occupation of public land and who has the better right of possession over it remains with the courts. But once the DENR has decided, particularly through the grant of a homestead patent and the issuance of a certificate of title, its decision on these points will normally prevail.

Therefore, while the issue as to who among the parties are entitled to a piece of public land remains pending with the DENR, the question of recovery of possession of the disputed property is a matter that may be addressed to the courts.

2) NO. Petitioners cite Garvida v. Sales Jr. and argue that the Certification is a new matter being raised by respondents for the first time on appeal. We are not persuaded. In Garvida, the Court held:

Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic.

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda.  The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida.  The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification.  In fact, the DENR regional director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998. If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was under the former’s direct control and supervision. 

Petitioners’ claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect.  As early as the pretrial conference at the MTC, the CENR Certification had already been marked as evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order. The Certification was not formally offered, however, because respondents had not been able to file their position paper.

Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of evidence that has not been formally offered during the trial.  But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.

3) NO. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.  Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.

While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses’ respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven.  Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.

4) NO. For the Court to uphold the contention of petitioners, they have first to prove that the possession of respondents was by mere tolerance.  The only pieces of evidence submitted by the former to support their claim were a technical description and a vicinity map drawn in accordance with the survey dated May 22, 1936. Both of these were discredited by the CENR Certification, which indicated that the contested lot had not yet been allocated to any person when the survey was conducted. The testimony of petitioners’ witnesses alone cannot prevail over respondents’ continued and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot for a considerable length of time. Furthermore, this is an issue of fact that cannot, as a rule, be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45.